Mark Duggan Inquest

Mark Duggan 1981-2011
The evening of 4th August 2011.  At Ferry Lane (Tottenham, London), the Police intercepted and stopped a taxi (or minicab) carrying Mr Mark Duggan.  Mr Duggan got out of the vehicle.  Two shots were fired at Mr Duggan by one of two Police Officers confronting him.  The officer who fired is referred to as V53.  The other officer is W42.  Mr Duggan died as a result.  A handgun was found at the other side of a fence which was alongside the pavement where the Police had shot Mr Duggan.   (There is also a short section of wall).   These are the bare facts of this situation.  Serious disorder followed this event, not only in London but in many other cities and towns.  The disorder was covered extensively on this blog and elsewhere.   The Police claimed that officer V53 had acted in self-defence in the honest belief that Mr Duggan was holding a gun at the time.

The following images - extracted from
the report in the Daily Mail 9th January - appear to be a reasonably accurate reconstruction of the situation when Mr Duggan was confronted by Officers W42 and V53. 


In this post I do not seek to comment upon the accuracy of the jury's conclusions which have been considered, in some quarters, to be either controversial or perverse.  There is no appeal mechanism from an inquest though a judicial review is possible - * Note 1.  The post looks at the conclusions, the law (as set out at the inquest) and some other matters.

Media reports:

The Guardian 8th January - article by Crime Correspondent Vikram Dodd

Daily Mail 9th January


The Telegraph 9th January

The Independent 9th January


The conclusions of the jury:

On 8th January, the Inquest into Mr Duggan's death concluded that his killing, at the hands of the Metropolitan Police in August 2011, was lawful.  The determination of the jury may be read via the Duggan Inquest website - see Inquest touching upon the death of Mark Duggan  The Inquest website contains a link to the extensive evidence put to the court.

The jury were asked by the Coroner to answer 5 questions:

Q1.  In the period between midday 3 August and when state Amber was called at 6.00 pm on 4th August 2011, did the MPS and SOCA do the best they realistically could have done to gather and react to intelligence about the possibility of Mr Duggan collecting a gun from Mr Hutchinson Foster?  The jury answered NO (unanimously) together with some additional remarks which may be read via the link already provided.

Q2.  Was the stop conducted in a location and in a way which minimised to the greatest extent possible recourse to lethal force?  The jury answered YES (unanimously).

Q3. Did Mr Duggan have the gun with him in the taxi immediately before the stop?  The jury said YES (unanimously).

Q4.  How did the gun get to the grass area where it was later found?  The jury said (9 to 1) that Mr Duggan threw the firearm onto the grass.  Of the 9, 8 concluded that it is more likely than not, that Mr Duggan threw the firearm as soon as the minicab came to a stop and prior to any officers being on the pavement.  The other one of the 9 concluded that Mr Duggan threw the firearm whilst on the pavement.  The minority juror was not convinced that Mr Duggan threw the gun at all because no witnesses gave evidence to this effect.


Q5. When Mr Duggan received the fatal shot did he have the gun in his hand?  This question was presented to the jury in three parts:

If you are sure that he did not have a gun in his hand then tick the box accordingly and then go on to consider unlawful killing, lawful killing or an open conclusion.  A majority (8 of the 10) of the jurors were sure that he did not have a gun in his hand at this time.

If you find that it was more likely than not that he did have a gun in his hand tick the box accordingly and then go on to consider lawful killing or an open conclusion.  Only 1 juror so found.

If you conclude that it is more likely than not that he did not have a gun in his hand then tick the box accordingly and go on to consider lawful killing or an open conclusion.  Only 1 juror so found.


The first and last of these parts required a finding that Mr Duggan did not have the gun in his hand when he was shot.  The difference lies in the degree of proof asked for: sure that he did not ... or ... more likely than not that he did not ...

(Interestingly, as a matter of strict law, even if the finding had been in favour of the second part (i.e. gun in the hand) it is possible that a jury might go on to consider the killing to be unlawful if, for example, they considered that the force used was unreasonable).

Hence, on the jury's view of the case,  Mr Duggan had a gun with him in the minicab and, when confronted by the Police, did not have the gun in his hand.  Somehow, the gun got to the grass on the other side of the fence/wall.  The majority of the jury believed that Mr Duggan threw it there and did so from the minicab.

The law:

The Inquest touching upon the death of Mark Duggan sets out the possible conclusions: Unlawful Killing, Lawful Killing or an Open Conclusion.  The Coroner set out the relevant law relating to self-defence as follows:



:  The law as set out for the jury  :
Unlawful.

You have to be sure that the act was unlawful -that is that it was not done in lawful self defence or defence of another or in order to prevent crime. It is not for V53 to prove that he did act lawfully – before you conclude that his act was unlawful, you must be sure that it was unlawful.

Any person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend himself or another from injury, attack or threat of attack. If V53 may have been defending himself or one of his colleagues then go on to consider two matters

1) Did V53 honestly believe or may he honestly have believed, even if that belief is mistaken, that at the time he fired the fatal shot, that he needed to use force to defend himself or another; if your answer is NO then he cannot have been acting in lawful self defence and you can put that issue to one side; if your answer is YES then go on to consider

2) Was the force used – the fatal shot – reasonable in all the circumstances?  Obviously if someone is under attack from someone he genuinely believes is violent and armed – then that person cannot be expected to weigh up precisely the amount of force needed to prevent that attack. But if he goes over top and acts out of proportion to the threat then he would not be using reasonable force and his action would be unlawful.  The question whether the degree of force used by V53 was reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided by reference to the circum stances as V53 believed them to be – but the degree of force is not to be regarded as reasonable in the circumstances as V53 believed them to be if it was disproportionate in those circumstances.

(Alternatively a police officer may use lawful force to prevent crime. Here two points arise

1) Did V53 shoot Mark Duggan in order to prevent crime

and

2) Was the force used reasonable or unreasonable in all the circumstances?

This appear to be an accurate statement of the law relating to self-defence: a topic which takes up considerable space in the criminal law texts.  In part, this is due to (a) the need to discuss the common law principles and (b) the effect of various enactments - e.g. Criminal Law Act 1967; Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 s.76.   Section 76 applies whether the alleged offence took place before, or on or after, the date on which that section comes into force (i.e. 14th July 2008)..

Since 2011, the law has been further modified by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 s.148 (in force 14th May 2013) and the Crime and Courts Act 2013 s.43 (in force 25th April 2013).


Other points:

A) The Guardian report raises some questions about the handling of the incident.

1. The Police reporting (incorrectly) at the time that Mr Duggan had actually fired the gun at the officers.
2. The IPCC made that public to journalists, wrongly giving the impression Duggan had been killed after firing at police, without attributing the claim to the Met. One of the officers who had surrounded Duggan had indeed been hit by a bullet, which had lodged in his radio. However, it had not been fired by Duggan but by V53, before it passed through the suspect's arm and hit the officer.
3. The cab, a potential goldmine of forensic information, was driven away before being brought back.
4. Three days after the shooting, on 7 August, after Tottenham had burned and nearby Wood Green had been ransacked, the armed officers were allowed to sit together in a room at Leman Street station in east London for eight hours and write their full statements after conferring.
5. When the IPCC investigated, the officers refused to answer questions in interview, instead providing written statements.
6. The Police will also have to answer the critical comments of the jury in relation to Question 1 (above).

B) The IPCC

See the statement from the IPCC following the jury's conclusions.  Also, the various other IPCC statements etc. relating to the Duggan case.  At the time of writing, the IPCC investigation is on-going. 

C) Behaviour in court

According to the Daily Mail and other reports, there were outbursts in the court including abuse of the jurors.  This is not the first time that similar things have happened.  It should not be tolerated and could be dealt with as a contempt in the face of the court.  The Ministry of Justice ought to take a serious look at this matter with a view to improving security, ensuring protection of those administering justice (including jurors) and enabling the courts to conduct their business in a calm atmosphere.

E) Coroners and the law

Previous posts - 18/9/12 Coroners - Chief Coroner and updating the system and 21/9/12 The Chief Coroner's Ten Point Plan


Note 1 - the system of appeals which was set out in section 40 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 Act was not implemented.   The government announced this in January 2012 and the Public Bodies Act 2011 section 33 repealed the provisions in the 2009 Act relating to appeals (including section 40).  This still means that the only way of challenging a Coroner's decision remains judicial review in the High Court or by the process of asking the Attorney-General to go to the High Court to ask for a new inquest (Coroners Act 1988 section 13).  Parliament July 2012 - Briefing Note -  Challenging Coroner's Decisions
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The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill ~ possible amendment

UPDATE 9th January:  The amendment set out below was carried in the House of Lords by a majority of 178.  The debate may be viewed via Democracy Live.


An amendment has been moved to the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill.  For details see Big Brother Watch and HERE.

LORD DEAR,  BARONESS MALLALIEU,  LORD MACKAY OF CLASHFERN

Page 1, line 8, leave out from “in” to end of line 9 and insert “anti-social behaviour.
( )   Anti-social behaviour is—
(a)   conduct that has caused, or likely to cause, harassment, alarm or
distress to any person, or
(b)   in the case of an application for an injunction under this section by
a housing provider, conduct capable of causing nuisance or
annoyance to any person.”

The government has proposed a cross-amendment - HERE.  


Page 1, line 8, leave out “capable of causing” and insert “that could reasonably be
expected to cause”

Previous post of 7th January 2014.
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The Anti-social behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill ~ IPNAs

Update 8th January:  An amendment to Clause 1 of the Bill has been put forward in the House of Lords.  See HERE.   This amendment was carried - see also Democracy Live. 

The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill has almost completed its Parliamentary process.  For some, it is seen as a very illiberal bill - e.g. see the article by George Monbiot in The Guardian 6th January.  Monbiot goes so far as to assert that this is 'the most oppressive bill pushed through any recent parliament.'   Concern was expressed in the Pre-Legislative Scrutiny Report about the continual widening of what amounts to anti-social behaviour - (Page 26 of this report).

An earlier post on this blog looked at the bill when it was first introduced and noted that there remains the long-stop of the Human Rights Act 1998 which public authorities are required to follow.  Here is a good example of why either removing or limiting the scope of human rights protection could result in serious erosion of freedom.  The Bill is replete with human rights implications though, as is usual, the government issued a statement of compatibility.

In this post, I take a brief overview of the Bill
as it now stands - (see Parliament - Bills) - and then consider in a rather more detail the Anti-social Behaviour elements in Part 1 of the Bill (Injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance).  However, this post is not intended to be in any way an authoritative guide to this legislation.

Overview:

The Bill - here is the latest text - extends to 14 Parts: 171 sections and 10 Schedules.



Part
Title
Notes
1
Injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance
Clauses 1 - 20
2
Criminal Behaviour Orders
21 - 30
3
Dispersal Powers
32-39
4
Community Protection

Chapter 1 – Community Protection Notices
Chapter 2 – Public Spaces Protection Orders
Chapter 3 – Closure of Premises associated with nuisance or disorder
40 - 85
5
Recovery of possession of dwelling-houses, Anti-social behaviour grounds
86 - 92
6
Local involvement and Accountability
93 - 97
7
Dangerous Dogs
98 - 99
8
Firearms
100 - 104
9
Protection from Sexual Harm and Violence
105 - 107
10
Forced Marriage
108 - 110
11
Policing etc
111 - 142
12
Extradition
143 - 160
13
Criminal Justice and Court fees
161 - 165
14
General
166 - 171
  Part 1 - Injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance:

Part 1 has to be read alongside Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 and, in relation to amendments to or repeals of other legislation see Schedule 10.  The new Injunction system will replace "Anti-social Behaviour Orders" (ASBO) which were first introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.  With the exception of injunctions applied for in Youth Courts for those under age 18, the new injunctions will not, unlike ASBOs, be issuable by the Magistrates' Courts.

Clause 1 empowers a court to grant an injunction against a person aged 10 or over (known as "the respondent") subject to two conditions:

  • The first condition is that the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has engaged or threatens to engage in conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person (“anti-social behaviour”).
  •  The second condition is that the court considers it just and convenient to grant the injunction for the purpose of preventing the respondent from engaging in anti-social behaviour.

An injunction under Clause 1 may - for the purpose of preventing the respondent from engaging in anti-social behaviour - either prohibit the respondent from doing anything described in the injunction or require the respondent to do anything described in the injunction.  Any prohibitions and requirements must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid (a) any conflict with the respondent's religious beliefs; (b) any interference with the times, if any, at which the respondent normally works or attends school or any other educational establishment; (c) any conflict with the requirements of any other court order or injunction to which the respondent may be subject.

An injunction has to specify the period for which it has effect or state that it has effect until further order.  However, if an injunction is imposed before a respondent reaches age 18 then a period must be specified and may not exceed 12 months.

Youth Courts will exercise this jurisdiction in respect of respondents under age 18.  In other cases, the matter will be decided by either the High Court or the County Court.

Clause 2 is concerned with what may be in an injunction. If an injunction includes a requirement to do something then the injunction must also specify who is to be responsible for supervising compliance with that requirement.  This could be an individual or an organisation.  The court must receive evidence about the suitability and enforceability of any proposed requirements.  Also, if 2 or more requirements are to be imposed then the court must consider their compatibility with each other.   The supervisor has onerous duties to make necessary arrangements in relation to the requirement and to promote compliance- (see clause 2 for further).  Clearly, not a duty to be undertaken lightly.  A respondent subject to a requirement must keep in touch with the person who is specified to supervise and must inform the supervisor of any change of address.  Failure to do either of those things may amount to breach of the injunction- see Clause 2(6).

Clause 3 deals with power of arrest.  A power of arrest may be attached by the court to a prohibition or requirement if the court thinks that - (a) the anti-social behaviour in which the respondent has engaged or threatens to engage consists of or includes the use or threatened use of violence against other persons, or(b) there is a significant risk of harm to other persons from the respondent.  (Whether there is significant risk would appear to be an exercise of judgment or evaluation to be made by the court. Here is a point which may have to fall for judicial decision).


Clause 4 contains a lengthy list of possible applicants.  However, it is likely that the principal applicants will be local authorities, housing providers or the Police.  A housing provider may make an application only if the application concerns anti-social behaviour that directly or indirectly relates to or affects its housing management functions.  The term "housing management functions" includes (a)functions conferred by or under an enactment; (b)the powers and duties of the housing provider as the holder of an estate or interest in housing accommodation.

Clause 5 deals with applications for injunctions without notice to the respondent.  "Without notice" proceedings are not entirely desirable but are sometimes necessary in practice.  They go against a fundamental principle of hearing both sides before making a decision (audi alteram partem).  It remains to be seen how the courts will handle this but the court is empowered by clause 5 to adjourn the proceedings and grant an interim injunction or simply adjourn or dismiss the application.  I suspect that courts will tread carefully before issuing interim injunctions in the absence of respondents. 

Clause 6 deals with Interim Injunctions.  An interim injunction may be made when the court adjourns the proceedings.  Such an injunction may be issued if the "court thinks it just to do so."  The only restriction in the legislation seems to be that an interim injunction made at a hearing of which the respondent was not given notice may not have the effect of requiring the respondent to participate in particular activities.

Clause 7 deals with variation and discharge of injunctions.  Clause 8 deals with the POLICE power of arrest but this only applies where the injunction includes a power of arrest.  "Where a power of arrest is attached to a provision of an injunction under section 1, a constable may arrest the respondent without warrant if he or she has reasonable cause to suspect that the respondent is in breach of the provision."  Clause 9 deals with Warrants for Arrest - "if the person who applied for an injunction under section 1 thinks that the respondent is in breach of any of its provisions, the person may apply for the issue of a warrant for the respondent’s arrest."  "A judge or justice may issue a warrant under this section only if the judge or justice has reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent is in breach of a provision of the injunction."  (This would seem to require the hearing of some evidence as opposed to taking merely the word of the applicant - this point which may require to be decided judicially). 

Clause 10 states that Schedule 1 (remands under sections 8 and 9) has effect. Clause 11 activates Schedule 2.  These are not considered further here.

Clauses 12 and 13 are applicable in cases where the applicant is a provider of residential accommodation.

Clause 14 includes a need to consult local Youth Offending Teams in relation to respondents aged 10 to under 18.  This is a particularly important provision though it remains to be seen how effective it is as a check against unmeritorious applications.   Clause 15 provides for appeal to the Crown Court when a Youth Court has issued an injunction.  Clause 16 enables special measures (similar to those in criminal proceedings) to be applied to witnesses.  Clause 17 disapplies the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 sc49.   This seems set to result in more children and young persons being publicly named.  Clause 18 provides for "Rules of Court" to be made.  Clause 19 is Interpretation and Clause 20 Savings and Transitional matters.

Sanctions:

The bill does not make specific provision for a standard of proof in relation to breaches of injunctions by those aged 18 or over.  Breach will not be a criminal offence (unlike the ASBO regime) but rather a breach of a civil injunction dealt with by way of contempt of court for adults.   Contempt of court is punishable with up to 2 years imprisonment.  There is a new scheme of punitive criminal-type sanctions for children.

For those under 18, Schedule 2 applies the criminal standard "beyond reasonable doubt" and this schedule goes on to specify the ways by which such individuals found to be in breach may be dealt.

Legal Aid:  Schedule 10 (para 49) appears to extend legal aid to this area.

Useful Links:

Legal opinion by Lord Macdonald QC on aspects of the Bill

Home Office - Factsheet

Liberty - Briefing on the Bill - essential reading here.  A highly critical and devastating analysis likely to be used as a point of reference by those seeking to challenge this system on human rights grounds.

When will this commence?

Following Royal Assent, the provisions will be brought into force by Commencement Orders. 

: Some of what was said in Parliament :

The following proceedings in the House of Lords may be of interest to those wishing to delve into this further.

Parliament - Pre-legislative Scrutiny

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill committee stage day three: Wednesday 20 November

Members of the Lords considered proposals for a new injunction to replace anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs), specifically new powers to exclude a person from their home in cases of violence or where others are at risk of being harmed. The need to involve local youth offending teams before an injunction is sought against anyone under 18 was raised by several members.

Other suggestions included a new civil penalty covering littering from vehicles and the introduction of a corporate anti-social behaviour order, granting authorities power to close premises that cause harassment, alarm or distress within communities.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill committee stage day two: Monday 18 November

Members of the Lords began by discussing proposals to abolish anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) and introduce injunctions for the prevention of nuisance and annoyance. The planned civil injunctions could be taken out on people from the age of ten - the question of whether this was appropriate and how it links to the current age of criminal responsibility was considered.
Protection for victims of anti-social behaviour, powers of arrest under the new injunction procedure and the role of police and crime commissioners in determining a local strategy to deal with anti-social behaviour were also considered.
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30 years ago ~ The Miner's Strike ~ Emergency Powers

30 years have elapsed since the Miner's Strike of 1984-5.  The Guardian 3rd January 2014 reports that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher requested plans to be prepared for the use of troops to move coal to power stations.  The article states that Thatcher "was secretly preparing to use troops and declare a state of emergency at the height of the miners' strike – out of fear Britain was going to run out of food and grind to a halt ..."

The phrase "declare a state of emergency" was interesting.  Did such a "declaration" actually give greater power to the authorities? 
The answer lay in the Emergency Powers Act 1920.   This Act had its origins in the Defence of the Realm Act 1914 (here).  In some circumstances; such as action interfering with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel or light; "His Majesty" could issue a proclamation of emergency to declare that a state of emergency existed.  A proclamation could be in force for one month but further proclamations were possible.  One a state of emergency existed, Orders in Council could be made under section 2 of the Act with a view to securing the essentials of life to the community.  Up to its repeal in 2004, this Act was used 12 times, mainly at periods of industrial unrest.

Common law:

In so far as there were any powers at common law to deal with emergencies, the 1920 Act can be taken to have left them alone.  English common law has seemed to be generally quite silent in this area though a few points might be noted:

1) There were many offences defined at common law to deal with disorder: riot, affray etc. (The outmoded procedure of "reading the riot Act" was abolished by the Criminal Law Act 1967).  The old common law offences are discussed in the Law Commission's Report on Public Order - Law Com 123, 1983.

2) The concept of "breach of the peace" is a common law notion and is still in force.  Thus, Magistrates have the power to "bind over" individuals to "keep the peace."   The Police also have power to arrest individuals when breach of the peace is imminent.   During the Miner's Strike, the police power to restrain breaches of the peace was used to controversial effect when the Police intercepted cars carrying miner's intending to picket.  The courts accepted that the police were entitled to act because of recent violence from pickets at the colliery and the likelihood of a  breach of the peace by reinforcements was a real possibility: Moss v McLachlan 1984.

In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Northumbria Police Authority [1989] 1 QB 26  it was recognised that there is prerogative power to do whatever "was necessary to meet either an actual or an apprehended threat to the peace". The case concerned the Home Office's decision to maintain a store of CS gas and plastic baton rounds. In 1986, a Home Office circular, 40/1986, authorised the Home Secretary to release this store to a police force without the approval of the Chief Constable if Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary agreed that it was necessary. The Northumbria Police Authority brought a judicial review case against this decision, arguing that it was ultra vires. The Divisional Court which heard the case recognised a prerogative power to keep the peace, which authorised the Home Office's actions. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the decision was confirmed.

3) Some jurisdictions have developed a law of necessity so that governmental actions in emergency can be justified.  The House of Lords seems to have come close to this in deciding Burmah Oil  v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75.  The case was concerned with the World War 2 destruction by the British Armed Forces of oil installations in Burma so that they were rendered useless to the Japanese Army.   The House of Lords held that this action was lawful but that compensation should be paid.  The possibility of compensation was removed by Parliament enacting the War Damage Act 1965. A significant feature of this Act is that it removed the common law right to compensation for damage (whether past or future) to property done by, or on the authority of, the Crown during, or in contemplation of the outbreak of a war in which the Sovereign was, or is, engaged.  The damage has to be "lawfully done" but it may occur in or outside the UK.

Modern statutory powers:

The old common law public order offences (riot etc) were replaced by new statutory offences in the Public Order Act 1986.

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 has now replaced the former Emergency Powers Acts. Of particular note is the wide definition in section 19 of "Emergency" and the extensive powers triggered by an "emergency" - Part 2 of the Act.   For a view that, at a stroke, democracy could be replaced by totalitarianism, see The Guardian 16th December 2008.  Whatever the truth of that statement, it should be noted that the Act provides for Parliamentary approval of regulations (sections 27 and 28).  However, with the abolition in 2013 of the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, section 25 was removed from the Civil Contingencies Act.  Section 25 was something of a control over emergency powers being used to establish a tribunal.

Civil Contingencies Act - history

Miner's Strike 1984 (Youtube)

This post was reproduced by Legal Week

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The fight for criminal legal aid and justice

Protest ~ Old Bailey, London
Today, lawyers took unprecedented action in their campaign on criminal legal aid.  As far as anyone knows, there has never been a previous day when lawyers have decided not to attend court.  The reasons for the action are well explained in a post on the Legal Cheek blog - This is why criminal lawyers are striking today.



"This year some public sector workers will receive pay rises. Criminal barristers and solicitors, meanwhile, have been told to expect pay cuts of 17.5% for less serious cases and 30% for very high cost cases (VHCCs)."

See also this article and video in which Mark George QC explains clearly the likely impact on justice of the proposals.  Also, this interview (on Youtube) is well worth watching - Sarah Forshaw QC talks to Huw Edwards.  Further excellent comments in The Guardian's article: Legal Aid: is this the cut that kills?

In 2013 there were two consultations on legal aid - see the posts of 4th June 2013 and 5th September 2013.   The government's response to the second consultation is awaited.  There can be little doubt that, if these cuts are implemented, the future for an INDEPENDENT criminal bar will be very grim.  Young talented lawyers will not be able to afford to practice in criminal law and that would have devastating longer term consequences for justice both in terms of prosecuting cases and defending those accused.

The Ministry of Justice also stands charged
with issuing misleading statistics relating to barrister's income.  The figures are challenged in this statement of 6th January by Nigel Lithman QC (Chairman of the Criminal Bar association).  Some blogs have addressed this matter - see Misinformation by Public Bodies (Pupillage and how to get it blog); Life at the thin end of the wedge - The grim reality of the independent junior criminal bar  (50 Shades of Affray).

The Law Society Gazette notes that Half day protest attracts hundreds of demonstrators.  Here are three quotations from this article:

A) "Chairman of the Criminal Bar Association Nigel Lithman QC told the gathering at Westminster Magistrates’ Court: ‘On this momentous day we stand on the brink of the collapse of the criminal justice system. After 37 years at the criminal bar I don’t say that lightly.’

Branding the MoJ a ‘Leviathan eating away at the legal aid system’, he said access to justice is as important in a free society as education and the National Health Service."

B) The Westminster rally was also addressed by Janis Sharp, the mother of Gary McKinnon, who fought extradition to the US over computer-hacking charges, and Patrick Maguire, one of the Maguire Seven wrongly convicted in the 1970s of handling explosives.

Sharp said that without legal aid lawyers, her son would have taken his own life, while Maguire warned of an increase in undetected miscarriages of justice if the cuts are implemented.


C) "Labour MP for Westminster North Karen Buck said it is not just high-profile cases that will be affected; people from all backgrounds can find themselves accused of crimes. She stressed in particular the potential impact on young people, especially those who are homeless or who lack family support.

Many such people, she said, ask her for help finding a lawyer to represent them. ‘I am proud of the local legal aid firms who give them representation,’ she said but expressed concern that this may become harder in the future.

‘The relationship between the legal profession and [justice secretary] Chris Grayling and the government has broken down – that is a sad and worrying circumstance,’ added Buck."

The following - extracted from Twitter - show some of the protests at various court locations:
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A Very Happy New Year 2014

New Year's Eve 2013
A VERY HAPPY NEW YEAR to all readers.  We are only just into the New Year so let's not be unduly serious for today!

The Telegraph informs us that Murderers could get hundreds of years in jail to get round the European Court ban.   Wait a moment ... it may apply to other offenders as well ... The Telegraph goes on .... "Murderers and other offenders convicted of very serious crimes could be given US-style jail sentences lasting hundreds of years to get round a ban by European human rights judges ..."  

The decision in Vinter v UK, is causing the judiciary some problems when sentencing for murder - (as discussed last month) - and a Court of Appeal ruling is imminent.  

I was reminded
by a follower on Twitter of this old cartoon:  


This year, we are expecting the Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor to reveal plans for the future of OUR human rights protection.  The plans will perhaps appear in the Conservative Party manifesto for the 2015 election.  Meanwhile, The Telegraph has chosen to give us a flavour of what may happen -- (article).  It is reported that the proposals being drawn up will be based on a Private Member's Bill proposed in March 2013 by Mr Charlie Elphicke MP.  This Bill may be seen at Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill  but it should be noted that the Bill has now been withdrawn.  It's worth reading it though to get a feel for the thinking. 


Europe is strangling the life our of democracy says Peter Oborne - The Telegraph 2nd January.  Interesting article here, looking at how the EU has come to be a form of "rule by bureaucrats, bankers, and various kinds of unelected expert."

In advance of action by lawyers in protest at government plans to reduce fees in criminal cases, the Ministry of Justice issued some statistics.  They are considered by the Pupillage and How to Get It blog.  To my mind, it would be fairer to refer to turnover in relation to a barrister's remuneration.  In many ways, it is akin to a small self-employed business.   

Here's wishing you all a Happy and, above all, a Peaceful year.

 
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