Activism in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ~ scope of 'Malicious Prosecution' extended

The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSC) and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) are located in Parliament Square, London.  The Supreme Court owes its existence to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 - (the CRA 2005).  The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has a long and interesting history and it was placed on a statutory basis by the Judicial Committee Act 1833 though this was recently amended by the CRA 2005.

The role of the JCPC is explained on the court's website.  Although the JCPC's role has declined, it remains the highest court of appeal for several countries, as well as the United Kingdom’s overseas territories, crown dependencies, and military sovereign base areas. Since most of the court's jurisdiction is external to the UK, its decisions do not strictly-speaking bind the English courts but they are persuasive precedents.  The composition of the JCPC naturally gives its decisions a high legal authority since its permanent judges are also the Justices of the UKSC though others occasionally sit.

A very interesting
and potentially important recent decision is Crawford Adjusters v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd [2013] UKPC 17 - Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lords Kerr, Wilson and Sumption.  The facts of the case arose from the damage caused by Hurricane Ivan in 2004 when it struck Grand Cayman and extensively damaged a residential village insured with Sagicor.  Restoration works commenced under the supervision of a local chartered surveyor.  The project was reviewed by a loss adjuster who had a history of animosity towards the surveyor.  Ultimately, actions against Sagicor arose including allegations of abuse of process and malicious prosecution.

The abuse of process claim was unanimously rejected by the JCPC.  It was not alleged that the legal process was used forany purpose for which it was not designed, and such an allegation could not have been made out on the facts. The claim for malicious prosecution succeeded on a 3 to 2 majority.  (The minority were Lords Neuberger and Sumption).

The majority considered that the common law originally recognised that the tort of malicious prosecution extended to both civil and criminal proceedings.  Wrongs should be remedied.  There was no evidence that the tort deterred the honest bringing of litigation or that it leads to interminable litigation.  The requirements to demonstrate both malice and the absence of a reasonable or probable cause for the launch of proceedings present formidable hurdles to prospective claimants.  Further conditions were not required. 

As the Law Society Gazette (15th July) points out:   

'To depart from the previous position in relation to malicious prosecution is a radical step and inevitably a calculated risk – if the majority are correct, parties will have an important weapon in achieving justice against those who institute proceedings with malevolent intent. The alternative and less desirable possibility is that unsuccessful claimants will find themselves faced with the prospect of expensive and protracted satellite litigation, and that the action will be used as a threat with which to deter parties from bringing meritorious claims.'

Only time will tell which of these competing viewpoints is correct.   Of course, it may be that the decision does not survive IF a similar matter ever reaches the UKSC.  That might depend on the composition of the court and judicial opinion is divided.  However that may be, it seems right in principle that the law should offer a remedy to those harmed by the deliberate misuse of litigation. 

Appointment of the next Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales announced


Downing Street has formally announced the appointment of Sir John Thomas as the next Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales Announcement and BBC 16th July.  'Her Majesty The Queen has been pleased to approve the appointment of The Rt Hon Sir John Thomas as the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales from 1 October 2013. This appointment follows the retirement of The Rt Hon The Lord Judge on 30 September 2013.'  Read Sir John's statement upon appointment.

The announcement contains a biography of Sir John.  He was born in Wales in 1947.  Called to the Bar by Gray's Inn in 1969.  Queen's Counsel 1984.  Judge of the High Court 1996 and was a Presiding Judge of the Wales and Chester Circuit from 1998-2001 after which he took charge of the Commercial Court (part of the High Court's structure).  Appointed Lord Justice of Appeal 2003 and Senior Presiding Judge for England and Wales 2003 to 2006.  Vice President of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court 2008 to October 2011 and thereafter President of the QBD.

This appointment
attracted a certain amount of media comment before the official announcement - e.g. Joshua Rozenberg in The Guardian 15th July.

Since the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 [the CRA 2005], the Lord Chief Justice is President of the Courts of England and Wales and is also Head of the the Judiciary of England and Wales [CRA 2005 s.7].   As President of the Courts he will (a) represent the views of the judiciary of England and Wales to Parliament, to the Lord Chancellor and to Ministers of the Crown generally; (b) maintain appropriate arrangements for the welfare, training and guidance of the judiciary of England and Wales within the resources made available by the Lord Chancellor; (c) maintain appropriate arrangements for the deployment of the judiciary of England and Wales and the allocation of work within courts.

The President of the Courts of England and Wales is president of the following courts and is entitled to sit in any of them: the Court of Appeal, the High Court, the Crown Court, the county court* and the magistrates' courts.  In practice, it would be rare for the Lord Chief Justice to sit other than in the Court of Appeal where his attention is required for the most serious and difficult cases.  The office also carries huge administrative burdens.

Sir John will be the 18th person to hold this office since the great legal reforms of 1875 when many separate courts merged to form the High Court of Justice - Wikipedia.  I think it is correct to say that he is only the second since 1875 to have been born in Wales.  The other being Alfred Lawrence (1st Baron Trevithin who served 1921-22).

The CRA 2005 is not entirely a happy reform.  Prior to the implementation of the Act, it was the Lord Chancellor who was Head of the Judiciary.  An interesting article about this appeared recently on the Constitutional Law Group Blog (26th June) - Does the Lord Chancellor really exist.  Detailed discussion of the reform may be read at the Select Committee on the Constitution 6th Report (2007).  At the end of January, the present Lord Chief Justice spoke about his role to the House of Lords Constitution Committee (HERE).

The CRA 2005 created the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom as a replacement for the House of Lords (strictly the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords).  This reform emphasised the separation of the judicial power from the legislative power.  The Supreme Court has its own President, Lord Neuberger, who took part in the selection procedure for the new Lord Chief Justice.

See also Week Woman - Our new Lord Chief Justice: a barrister's perspective
-----

Note* - Currently there are County Courts but there will be a single County Court when the Crime and Courts Act 2013 is fully implemented.

Syr John Thomas wedi ei benodi Arglwydd Brif Ustus Cymru a Lloegr a bydd yn cychwyn y swydd ar 1 Hydref, 2013
 

Kettling and Police Powers

Mengesha v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2013] EWHC 1695 (Admin) - Moses LJ and Wyn Williams J - is a short judgment on an important issue.  The court had to consider whether the Police can lawfully require individuals 'kettled' (or 'contained') to give their details or be videoed before they are allowed to leave the 'kettle' (or 'area of containment').  A further question related to the legality of the Police retaining CDs showing the individuals for 6 years being the limitation period for civil actions in respect of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.

On 30th November 2011, the Police authorised a 'kettle' on Panton Street, near Haymarket, London.  About 100 individuals were kettled including the claimant Mengesha who was present as a legal observer.  No one disputed that the containment was justified because serious damage and a breach of the peace had occurred and officers reasonably apprehended an imminent further breach of the peace.



At the time, there was authorisation under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 section 60 for a constable in uniform to stop any pedestrian and search for offensive weapons or dangerous instruments.  The Police took the view that those within the containment area should be searched as part of a disciplined release from containment.  The legality of such a search was not questioned.

As people were funnelled out of the containment area, a Chief Superintendent decided to film those leaving and obtain their details.  He took the view that such action would help in any subsequent post-incident investigation to identify persons involved in criminal acts.  The claimant was held in a separate area, surrounded by police officers, and filmed. She was asked to give her name and address and date of birth. She attempted to ask what police power was relied upon authorising the police to film her and ask her details. Those questions were not answered until she had been filmed and given her details.

The court noted that Police Powers exist which can require individuals to give their details to the Police.  The Police Reform Act 2002 section 50 enables the Police to require names and addresses of a person who has been or may have been behaving in an 'anti-social' manner.  (Anti-Social Behaviour Orders or ASBO  are another controversial area).   The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 section 64A allows the Police to photograph those who have been arrested.  Neither of those powers enabled the Police to take details and video before a person was allowed to leave a containment area and there was no statutory or common law power permitting such action.

Since the video had been obtained unlawfully, it could not be retained.

Videoing a member of the public engaged Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights when the video was  taken as the price of being required to leave a containment area.  The retention of the video was not 'in accordance with the law' and the retention was therefore a breach of Article 8.  The claimant merely sought vindication of her claim and did not seek any other form of just satisfaction.

The judgment is well worth reading in full.  At para. 12 is a succinct summary of the law relating to 'kettling'....

Although the common law has sanctioned containment it has done so in only restricted circumstances.  This is designed to avoid uncertainty and the potentially chilling effect on freedom of assembly and expression to which Lord Mance drew attention in R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary [2006] UKHL 55 [2007] 2 AC 105 at 141.  Containment is only permitted where a breach of the peace is taking place or is reasonably thought to be imminent.  It is a method of last resort where other possible steps to prevent a breach of the peace would be ineffective - Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2007] EWCA Civ 989 [2008] QB 660 at paras 20, 35 and 119(2) and it must be proportionate (R (Moos) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2012] EWCA Civ 12 at paras 39 and 95.   It is clear, therefore, that containment is not permissible for some purpose other than to prevent a breach of the peace which is taking place or reasonably thought to be imminent.

In principle, there is nothing to prevent any individual VOLUNTARILY offering the Police their details.  On the facts in this case, the court considered that the claimant had not acted voluntarily.  However, the reader may find paragraphs 14 to 16 of interest since the court discusses voluntary identification and notes an issue which may arise some future case but was not for decision in this case.

Addendum:For a further view on this case see Paul Bernals' blog -  Identity Crisis



Reflections on an interesting week in Strasbourg

Mordor - Lord of the Rings
This week saw the European Court of Human Rights decide two cases concerning the United Kingdom.  Vinter and others v UK (previous post) dealt with whole life orders imposed (exceptionally) for murder.  Allen v United Kingdom (previous post) was concerned with compensation for miscarriage of justice.  The British government lost Vinter (howls of Ministerial protest and headlines attacking interference by foreign court) and won Allen (Ministers enjoy a glass of Pimms on a sunny evening).

A good article by journalist Grace Dent appeared in The Independent 10th July

Dent's article - entitled - 'Appalled by the fuss over human rights for serial killers? - came after the Vinter judgment and before Allen.   Dent views basic human rights - (though she does not amplify on the word 'basic') - as a buffer zone keeping at bay the 'quiet savage lurking in all of us.'   Leaving to one side any Saints
(and I do not know any of those), who amongst us has not felt intense anger after the commission of numerous immensely serious crimes?   However, as Dent says, 'I love my country because at its heart is is civilised, fair and mindful about the concept of human rights.  It does this on my behalf, even during the times I may feel wholly savage.'  In addition, I also love my country because, amongst many other virtues, it has maintained the principle of access to justice for those who need it and not merely for the wealthy and powerful.

In Vinter, Strasbourg did not offer any prisoner even a right to be granted parole.  They are merely entitled to ask for it and, it might be added, for their request to be considered by an independent body.  Many may not want these men - (they are all men apart from Rosemary West) - to have any hope.  After all, the life hopes of their victims were cruelly extinguished and their relatives are left to mourn - perhaps for years as did the late Winnie Johnson - mother of Keith Bennett.   I have little sympathy for those properly convicted of such heinous crimes and yet, as Dent put it so eloquently, there is 'a wafer thin line in the human condition between what makes us fair, civil, humane and decent and what makes us barbarians.'   If Strasbourg has to deal with a few legally aided cases each year then that is a small price to pay for civility.

Withdrawal from the Convention is advocated by some notable members of the present coalition government.  IF that comes about, what would remain is not crystal clear.   Despite reductions in legal aid and access to justice, we might not quite descend into a kind of legal Land of Mordor.  However, when some of the illiberal laws enacted in recent years are considered, we might also be in a far worse position particularly if legal checks on that fundamental concept of the British constitution - (the Supremacy of Parliament) - were either very limited or non-existent.

Writing in The Guardian 12th July, Cherie Blair QC argues that concentration on cases such as Abu Qatada (now back in Jordan) paints a distorting picture and ordinary members of the public need the protection of human rights legislation too.  Blair offers examples of where human rights law has helped to secure justice.  Agree with her or not, the learned lady's article is worthy of consideration particularly when she says:

'Human rights are indivisible and universal. They are the most integral part of you, as a human being. They are the last (or first) line of defence between the individual and the state, and they need defending. You might not think you need them now, but you may just miss them if they're gone.'

A further excellent piece about the coalition government's stance on justice is by Francis Fitzgibbon QC - Short Cuts  - who argues that:

'A fundamental shift in the relationship between the government and the governed is taking place: by restricting access to the law, the state is handing itself an alarming immunity from legal scrutiny.'

Posts on Human Rights:

Domestic law and the European Convention on Human Rights - Part 1 - 5th May 2013

Domestic law and the European Convention on Human Rights - Part 2 - 7th May 2013

Domestic law and the European Convention on Human Rights - Part 3 - 14th May 2013

Domestic law and the European Convention on Human Rights - Part 4 - 18th May 2013



Compensation for Miscarriage of Justice ~ Allen v United Kingdom

On 12th July, the European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber gave judgment in Allen v United Kingdom - JUDGMENT - The Guardian 12th July.   The case concerned the refusal to grant compensation to a mother acquitted of the manslaughter of her four-month old son, following the quashing of her conviction.  The E Ct HR held, unanimously, that there had not been a violation of Article 6  of the European Convention on Human Rights.

On 7 September 2000 Ms Allen was convicted of the manslaughter of her four-month old son and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. The conviction was based on evidence given at her trial by expert medical witnesses who testified that her son’s injuries were consistent with “shaken baby syndrome”, also known as “non-accidental head injury” (“NAHI”), because of the presence of a triad of intracranial injuries.



In her appeal, Ms Allen claimed that new medical evidence suggested that the triad of injuries could be attributed to a cause other than NAHI. In the meantime, she was released from prison, having served her sentence.

On 21 July 2005 the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (“CACD”) quashed Ms Allen’s conviction on the grounds that it was unsafe. It found that the new evidence might have affected the jury’s decision to convict Ms Allen. The prosecution did not apply for a re- trial given that, by the time Ms Allen appealed her conviction, she had already served her sentence and a considerable amount of time had passed.

Ms Allen lodged a claim with the Secretary of State under section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which provides that compensation shall be paid to someone who was convicted of a criminal offence but has subsequently had that conviction reversed on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Her claim was refused on 31 May 2006. 

She brought judicial review proceedings challenging this decision. Her claim was dismissed by the High Court in December 2007. It concluded that, in Allen's appeal against conviction, the CACD had only decided that the new evidence, when taken with the evidence given at trial, “created the possibility” that a jury “might properly acquit” Ms Allen. Her appeal was subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeal in July 2008. Noting that the acquittal decision did “not begin to carry the implication” that there was no case for Ms Allen to answer, the Court of Appeal concluded that the test for “miscarriage of justice” had therefore not been made out.

Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused in December 2008.

The European Court of Human Rights found that the legislation under which Ms Allen had requested compensation did not require her criminal guilt to be assessed and did not question her innocence. Furthermore, the UK courts had considered, as they were required to do under that legislation in order for compensation to be awarded, whether any “miscarriage of justice” had taken place and had concluded that the existence of a miscarriage of justice had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.   They had not questioned the conclusion in her criminal appeal that her conviction was unsafe and had not commented on whether Ms Allen should be, or would likely be, acquitted or convicted on the basis of the new evidence which had led to the quashing of her conviction. Indeed, they had consistently repeated that it would have been for a jury to assess the new evidence, had a retrial been ordered. Therefore the language used by the UK courts in their decisions to decide on compensation had not undermined Ms Allen’s acquittal or treated her in a manner inconsistent with her innocence.

Justice Minister Damian Green MP is reported to have said - "I am pleased that the European Court of Human Rights has agreed with the judgment of our domestic courts and agrees that compensation is not applicable in this particular case." - BBC 12th July

Cases where new evidence proves innocence beyond a reasonable doubt will be the exception.  More usually, the new evidence raises some degree of doubt which, had it been presented to a jury, may have altered the jury's verdict.  The compensations scheme under section 133 pays lip-service to the UK's international obligations (under Article 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966).  A parallel 'ex gratia scheme' was abolished by the Labour government - a reminder that parsimony is not confined to the present coalition - see Justice Gap.

Previous posts:

Legal Aid Debate in House of Lords 11th July

On Thursday 11th July, the House of Lords debated the government's Transforming Legal Aid proposals.  The record of the debate is HERE and the proceedings may be viewed HERE. (the debate is opened by Baroness Deech at approximately 1406).  The House of Lords adopts a far less confrontational atmosphere than the House of Commons but the various speeches were no less critical of the government's proposals.  Many of the speakers pressed the government and the legal profession to work together to find a better solution to the legal aid issue.

Just a few extracts from the debate ......


What we are debating today is the health of one of the great pillars of our democracy and liberty; namely, our legal system and the way citizens may benefit from or challenge laws which, as this House knows well, are painstakingly established for the good of the community. Access to justice is every bit as vital to our societal health as access to health services - Baroness Deech

I draw your Lordships’ attention to some recent decisions of our highest court in claims that could not in practice have been brought without legal aid but would not be eligible for legal aid under the proposals. First, there is the Lumba case in 2011, the leading case on the Home Secretary’s ability to detain individuals using immigration powers .......  Secondly, there is the decision of the House of Lords in Simms in 2000, which held that Prison Service policy and instructions preventing prisoners from having oral interviews with journalists, even on questions of whether they had been wrongly convicted, were unlawful.  That claimant would no longer be eligible for legal aid, as he will be excluded under the prison law reforms. Thirdly, in Al-Skeini in 2007, the claim arose from the deaths of six Iraqi civilians and the brutal maltreatment of one of them, causing his death. Each of the deceased was killed, and the maltreatment was inflicted by members of the British Armed Forces. That claim, which succeeded in the Supreme Court, could not be brought under the proposals, because the claimants would fail the residence test - Lord Irvine of Lairg

This debate is actually about an important constitutional issue, as others have said. It is a constitutional issue because legal aid has an important constitutional function. It is about access to justice, but it is also about the integrity of our criminal and civil justice system as a whole. Further, it is a constitutional issue because it is about holding government and public bodies to account. It is not just legal aid lawyers who are complaining, it is judges, commercial lawyers, academic lawyers who study the effects of law on people’s lives, and indeed most lawyers who see that the system is of a piece and that taking the shears to parts of it has implications for the whole. Justice is a central component of any civilised society and we have to maintain trust in it - Baroness Kennedy of the the Shaws

However, I regard the proposal [on Judicial Review] not as mischievous but merely as fundamentally misguided. It is misguided because it stems from a basic misapprehension of the place of permission in the process of judicial review and it would result in consequences far removed from those intended and very damaging to this critical part of the courts’ jurisdiction—the ability to supervise the proper exercise of public power - Lord Brown

This debate is about something fundamental: the quality of the society in which we live. It is about the clarity of the political conscience, which must be sure that our legal institutions are properly implemented and are to be trusted. One of my great mentors was the much-lamented Emlyn Hooson, a colleague of ours on these Benches and one of my predecessors as Member of Parliament for Montgomeryshire. Emlyn Hooson represented Ian Brady on legal aid at his celebrated trial—the Moors murders trial. One of the reasons why we have been able to be confident that what has happened to Ian Brady has been just is because he had the advantage of a proper legal aid defence of the highest quality. We should let go of that at our peril - Lord Carlile of Berriew

The Government’s latest proposals, following on frighteningly fast from the implementation of part 1 of LASPO, have been the subject of sustained and deadly attack during this debate. For example, my noble and learned friend Lord Irvine effectively pulled apart the proposals for judicial review, particularly the residence test, revealing it as a tawdry ideological assault on the rule of law and the Lord Chancellor’s duty to uphold it - Lord Bach

Is it the philosophy that the right to legal aid—and thus the ability to make a claim against a state—should be based on the status of the claimant? Is our system, with its grand tradition of protecting the rights of all, to become so diminished that it will not allow justice, where it is necessary, for all those who need it?  - Lord Bach

The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally) responded to the debate.  He did not place on record a detailed response to the many individual points and questions raised but said that he would treat the Hansard of the debate as an input unto the consultation under way.  He also promised to see whether he could cover some of the specific points in an omnibus letter to be circulated later.

Meddlesome European Judges ~ the E Ct HR ~ Mubenga Inquest ~ Female Offenders

' .... meddling European judges rule even Britain's most evil killers have human right to seek freedom' - was how the Daily Mail 10th July greeted the European Court of Human Rights (E Ct HR) decision in Vinter and others v UK. The howls from British Ministers were all too predictable - (The Guardian 9th July) - and the decision seems to have reinforced desire within at least the Conservative Party to take the UK out of the European Convention on Human Rights (E Conv HR).  Article 58 of the Convention permits a State to 'denounce' the convention on giving 6 months notice to the Council of Europe.

Upon a calmer analysis, the Vinter case does NOT tell the UK that it cannot apply whole life orders to the worst murderers.  The judgment requires a review of the need for continued detention after a period of perhaps 25 years with periodic reviews thereafter.  There has to be a penological reason for continuing detention such as
the risk of danger to the public if the individual were to be released.  Ministers should also consider that the UK argued before the E Ct HR that our law already allowed for the possibility of release if it could be shown that there were no penologoical grounds for continuing detention of a particular prisoner.  Any changes to the law or the Prison Order as a result of Vinter should not therefore present the sort of fundamental change in penal policy which Ministerial rhetoric suggests.

For a critical look at the Vinter case see Carl Gardner's Head of Legal blog.   Gardner concludes that the judgment is open to criticism and thinks that 'it goes too far by effectively ruling out prospective whole life orders in all cases, even though none of the applicants showed any unfairness in his own specific case. But it’s not as obviously bad or overreaching as Hirst or S and Marper, it does not have any serious or immediate effect on our legislation and it does not make any actual prisoner more likely, in the real world, to be released. It ought not to be that big a political deal. But I’m not surprised that it is.'

Oxford Human Rights Hub - Why the majority was right to find that whole life orders violate Art 3


National Profiles on the E Ct HR website:

The E Ct HR wesbite has a profile for each State.  The UK's profile is interesting.   There were 2082 applications from the UK in 2012.   2047 of those were inadmissible or struck out.  24 judgments were handed down with 10 violations found.  The 13 page profile contains short notes about cases which have involved the UK and also refers to a number of pending cases.  The Convention has touched our domestic law in a considerable number of areas such as freedom of religion; asylum and immigration; terrorism and national security; police powers; surveillance; LGBT rights; Trade Unions etc.

Risky Changes afoot at E Ct HR:

Remember the Brighton Declaration and concern over the backlog of cases at Strasbourg?  Some important changes are afoot and these are covered in an excellent post by Andrew Tickell on the UK Human Rights blog - Radical but risky changes afoot at the European Court of Human Rights.  As Tickell argues:

' ... these changes are unlikely to trouble the small number of wealthy litigants whose cases have already been aired in the highest domestic courts before finding their way onto the European Court’s docket. By contrast, the changes to time-limits, compounded by the Court’s new Rules, risk having a disproportionate effect on the poorest and most vulnerable applicants, with the least access to legal advice, subject to the worst outrages at the hands of their states.'

UK and the European Union (EU):

According to The Guardian 9th July   the Home Secretary, Theresa May, has announced that the UK will opt out of 133 EU criminal justice measures, using a "block opt-out" negotiated by a previous Labour government. It will then seek to sign up again to some 35 of them, including a "reformed" European arrest warrant (EAW).  The EU opt-out is also about the role of the Court of Justice of the EU.  Once the UK opts back in to these 35 measures, EU judges rather than UK judges will have the last word on how they are interpreted.

Jimmy Mubenga Inquest:

An inquest has ruled that, in 2010, Jimmy Mubenga was unlawfully killed during his deportation from the UK: The Independent 9th July.  In 2011, the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to prefer any charges but it is now reported that this decision is being reconsidered.

Amnesty has commented about the inquest and is calling for 'a root-and-branch overhaul of the entire immigration removal system.'  In 2011, Amnesty published a report Out of Control: The case for a complete overhaul of enforced removals by private security companies (PDF).

INQUEST has produced a 'Briefing' on the case (HERE) and calls for a parliamentary committee inquiry into the use of restraint and force in deportation cases and the use of private companies in the removal process.

Magistrates and the Treatment of female offenders:

The Howard League for Penal Reform has expressed concern that some Magistrates' Courts are four times as likely to send a woman to prison than others Magistrates' Courts.   Frances Crook, chief executive of the Howard League for Penal Reform, said:

"We welcome the drop in the use of short prison sentences for women in recent years, but it remains the case that a woman convicted of a non-violent offence is more likely to go to prison than a man.

Women who find themselves in court often need a lot of support. They are often victims of crimes themselves such as domestic abuse or pimping. Sending these women to prison for a few weeks is not the answer to the complex issues in their lives.

"We are concerned that legislation currently going through parliament may make the situation for women worse. The offender rehabilitation bill extends short prison sentences with a year of supervision in the community but it is unclear how specialist services for women will survive as the government seeks to privatise probation using large regional contracts that will squeeze out small local providers."

A final thought:

Vinter v UK ~ 'whole lifers' and the thorny issue of release

As noted in the previous post, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that the United Kingdom breached Article 3 of the Convention by imposing whole life orders without possibility of review for murder: Judgment

At Strasbourg, the British government argued that English law already permits the release of a prisoner serving a whole life order.  The government's case was based on section 30  of the Crime Sentences Act 1997 as interpreted by the Court of Appeal in  R v Bieber.  Despite that argument, the court noted that Prison Order 4700 Chapter 12 contained an 'explicitly stated and restrictive policy' on which the section 30 power would be exercised.  The Prison Service Order provides that release will only be ordered in certain exhaustively listed, and not merely illustrative, circumstances - e.g. terminal illness.   The Order was highly restrictive.  This looked very much like the government saying one thing but doing another.   

The court found that the applicable domestic law lacked clarity.   The Prison Order
needed amendment to tell the whole story.  It did not include matters such as the effect of the Human Rights Act and of Article 3 of the Convention on the exercise of the Secretary of State’s power to release under section 30 of the 1997 Act.  The Order did not reflect the possibility of release of a prisoner on legitimate penological grounds arising some time into the sentence.  

Therefore, the Court was unable to accept the Government’s submission that section 30 of the 1997 Act could be taken as providing the applicants with an appropriate and adequate avenue of redress if they ever sought to demonstrate that their continued imprisonment was no longer justified on legitimate penological grounds and thus contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

Apart from the entirely predictable expressions by Ministers of 'disappointment' it is not yet clear what, if anything, the government intends to do about the Vinter judgment.  Strictly speaking, the government is bound by the European Convention to bring its law and practices into line with this binding and final judgment.

Writing in The Guardian 9th July, Joshua Rozenberg suggested that the Prison Order be amended and that a review mechanism be put in place.   The Grand Chamber did not spell out how this should operate but suggested that every life sentence should be reviewed no later than 25 years after it was passed with further periodic reviews thereafter.   The decision-maker in such cases would have to be independent - e.g. the Parole Board or a Judge.  Of course, as Rozenberg says, that is the last thing Ministers want.

It might also be an idea to actually amend section 30 so that its wording clearly goes beyond compassion and reflects the situation established by the Bieber and Vinter cases. 

In finding a violation in this case, however, the Court did not intend to give the applicants any prospect of imminent release. Whether or not they should be released would depend, for example, on whether there were still legitimate penological grounds for their continued detention and whether they should continue to be detained on grounds of dangerousness. These questions were not in issue in this case and were not the subject of argument before the Court.  Fewer than 50 prisoners are serving 'whole life' orders.



Vinter and others v UK ~ European Court of Human Rights

The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has held that the United Kingdom is in breach of Article 3 of the Convention by imposing whole life orders without possibility of review for murder.  The key words there are without possibility of review.  The court's judgment does not mean that such prisoners will necessarily be released but it does mean that the UK must put in place a review process so that any whole life order can be reconsidered in the light of circumstances.  Given that the imposition of whole life orders is already exceptional, it is perhaps unlikely that many such prisoners will be ultimately successful in securing their release and, even if they did, release would be on licence.  The power of the Secretary of State to act on compassionate grounds remains in place: section 30 of the Crime Sentences Act 1997.


Previous post - 28th November 2012 - Whole Life Terms for Murder - Vinter and others v UK

The court's judgment

The following is from the court's press release:


United Kingdom (application nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10), which is final, the European Court of Human Rights held, by 16 votes to one, that there had been: a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The case concerned three applicants’ complaint that their imprisonment for life amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment as they had no hope of release.

The Court found in particular that, for a life sentence to remain compatible with Article 3, there had to be both a possibility of release and a possibility of review. It noted that there was clear support in European and international law and practice for those principles, with the large majority of Convention Contracting States not actually imposing life sentences at all or, if they did, providing for a review of life sentences after a set period (usually 25 years’ imprisonment).

The domestic law concerning the Justice Secretary’s power to release a person subject to a whole life order was unclear. In addition, prior to 2003 a review of the need for a whole life order had automatically been carried out by a Minister 25 years into the sentence. This had been eliminated in 2003 and no alternative review mechanism put in place. In these circumstances, the Court was not persuaded that the applicants’ whole life sentences were compatible with the European Convention.

In finding a violation in this case, however, the Court did not intend to give the applicants any prospect of imminent release. Whether or not they should be released would depend, for example, on whether there were still legitimate penological grounds for their continued detention and whether they should continue to be detained on grounds of dangerousness. These questions were not in issue in this case and were not the subject of argument before the Court.

Inquest or Inquiry? Litvinenko

Update 3rd October - Litvinenko's widow to seek judicial review of decision not to hold an inquiry - RTE Ireland 

Update 12th July - an Inquiry has been ruled out even though the Coroner (Owen J) requested it - BBC News UK 12th July


Update 9th July:  Judicial Review concerning public interest immunity in Litvinenko proceedings - Temple Garden Chambers
The judgment of the Administrative Court is HERE. 

Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights imposes an obligation on States to carry out an effective investigation into certain deaths.  As an example, the duty normally arises where a person is killed by Police Officers - e.g. the Azelle Rodney Inquiry or where there is the death of a person in custody - e.g. Nicholas Wheller Inquest.  In England and Wales, inquests are held by the Coroners Courts.  Those courts and their procedure are undergoing a programme of changes based on the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and further changes were implemented with effect from 2nd July 2013.

A number of recent cases have demonstrated that a Coroner's inquest may not always be practicable and, if that proves to be so, the alternative becomes an inquiry held under the Inquiries Act 2005.  Such inquiries are particularly costly and lengthy.  For example, the Azelle Rodney Inquiry has just reached its conclusion after some 3 years and a cost exceeding £2m.

As the law stands, one reason why
an inquest may not be practicable is where evidence obtained by interception of communications ('intercept evidence') has to be adduced.  The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 section 17 renders such evidence inadmissible in legal proceedings but there are exceptions - section 18  including an Inquiry held under the Inquiries Act 2005 - see 18(7)(c).

The Litvinenko Inquiry - (death in 2006) - is a further example.  High Court Judge, Sir Robert Owen, has been appointed as Assistant Deputy Coroner for Inner North London to lead this Inquest.  (Note: The title was later changed to HM Assistant Coroner for Inner London North).  The Inquest was adjourned for nearly 5 years while there was thought to be a prospect of criminal proceedings being brought. By the time of the pre-inquest review held by the Coroner for Inner North London, Dr Andrew Reid, in October 2011, it was clear that no criminal prosecutions would be brought because the two men suspected by police of murdering Mr Litvinenko are outside the UK.  Owen J has written to the Lord Chancellor to request that, in place of the inquest, an Inquiry be held.  This is because issues of Public Interest Immunity (PII) have arisen.  A successful PII claim excludes the material entirely since, at an inquest, there is no closed material procedure.

On 12th July, the Litvinenko Inquest will convene  in order to update interested parties of developments since the request for an inquiry was sent to the Lord Chancellor - see Operational Note.

If an inquest is unable or inappropriate to deal with a case then an inquiry appears to be the only alternative.   One way of avoiding the expense and timescale of an inquiry would be to permit inquests with closed sessions where necessary.   However, such a system would almost certainly be considered to prevent the involvement of a jury.

On a number of occasions, the Labour government wished to legislate for closed inquests but these proposals met with considerable criticism: for example Liberty-Human Rights.   Ultimately, when the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 received Royal Assent the proposals for secret inquests had been dropped and replaced by section 11 and Schedule 1.  Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 is a power for the Lord Chancellor to suspend an inquest and replace it with an inquiry on the ground that the cause of death is likely to be adequately investigated by an inquiry under the chairmanship of a 'senior judge'.  This power actually came into force on 25th July 2013.

Legal aid is not usually available for inquests or inquiries but the possibility of exceptional funding should be considered in appropriate cases - see Lord Chancellor's guidance for inquests.  For my part, I am not convinced that this guidance accurately reflects the state of the case law on Article 2.  The guidance is very much based on the view that the procedural obligation under Article 2 only arises where there is an arguable case that the State is in breach of its substantive obligations under Article 2.  However, as far as the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is concerned, this may not be the accurate position.  On this see the interesting article by Aidan O'Neill QC on the UK Supreme Court blog - Some reflections on Article 2 and the procedural obligations to investigate deaths.  O'Neill argues that the Strasbourg case law is quite unequivocal in rejecting the claim of the procedural obligation to investigate deaths being dependent on an arguable breach of the substantive obligation on the part of the State to protect life.

Those wishing to delve into this further may find the following links useful:

The Right to Life - Article 2

Human Rights Review 2012 - Article 2

Interception evidence

Backbench Debate - Intercept evidence in courts and inquests - 18th October 2012

Parliament - Briefing Paper - The use of Intercept Evidence in Terrorism cases - 24th November 2011

Privy Council Review of Intercept as Evidence - 30th January 2008

Justice Student Human Rights Network - Intercept Evidence

Oxford University - Legal Opinion on Intercept Communication - January 2006

Conor Gearty - Short Cuts

UK Human Rights blog - Kennedy v UK  [2010] ECHR 682

Crown Prosecution Service - Disclosure Manual - Dealing with Intercept Product

Liberty - Right to Life Inquests

History:

Birkett Report ..... Malone v UK ..... Interception of Communications Act 1985 (as enacted) ..... Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000